Future Generations: What Do We Owe Them?

The idea that we have obligations to future generations is not a new one– in fact, to most of us it probably sounds pretty intuitive. It seems wrong to entirely disregard the needs or wants of future generations when making big decisions– ones that will affect them– doesn’t it? Most agree with this, but the reasoning behind the claim is relatively hard to pinpoint. Here I will outline a few possible theories outlining such an obligation, though what exactly these moral obligations require of us will not be discussed in detail here. 

One way we could argue in favor of such obligations is by simply appealing to the moral intuitions outlined in my opening paragraph. I would argue, for example, that most people would agree that we should at least consider the needs of future generations when making important decisions. Perhaps it is this seemingly broad societal consensus that creates some sort of obligation. Such an approach has its issues, however, as society can (and has) come to a broad consensus on immoral or otherwise detrimental acts as well. We might look at colonialism, slavery, or segregation as examples of such behaviors. Each of these behaviors was at one point deemed ‘ok’ and allowed to continue until real challenges were made against it. 

A more plausible approach might be proposed in a two-pronged model. It seems that there are two key premises at play in the debate that, when used alone, are relatively weak, but when used together form a much stronger claim. The first ‘prong’ is simply that we care about the people who will live in the future. The second prong is that future generations (i.e. people) have a stake in the future– that is they have an interest in how the world changes and develops. Future generations are, after all, the people who will experience the way the world changes first-hand. Perhaps it is the interaction of these two prongs that creates some sort of moral obligation. We might argue that if we truly care about something, and that thing has a stake in a particular decision, we have an obligation to avoid harming that thing. Consider the next generation, who has not yet been born but will certainly feel the effects of our decisions. We might argue that because we care about this incoming generation, and because they will be directly affected by our decisions, we are obligated to avoid harming them when reasonably possible. This seems relatively intuitive, and we might then extend this obligation past them to other, further, future generations. 

Another way we might argue in favor is by appealing to popular conceptions of justice and fairness. This idea may best be conveyed in the context of climate change. Here we could argue that because we inherited an inhabitable world, we have a responsibility to pass an inhabitable world on to the next generation. We might say that it would be unfair or unjust for us to take such a basic human need from them when we benefited from precisely the same thing. This view is most rooted in contemporary ideas of reciprocity and gratitude. We would argue that the actions of previous generations have benefitted us and allowed us to prosper, and thus we have an obligation to pass this along to future generations. This view is not without its problems, however. Perhaps most notably, it relies on the assumption that we are better off with what the previous generations have given us. What if this is not the case, though? If the previous generations lead our country into ruin and severely damage our quality of life, this argument seems to fall apart. In short– it seems dangerous to base our obligations to future generations (or anyone else) on the actions of previous generations, for their actions are out of our control. 

Perhaps the most convincing argument, however, would be to argue that we have a responsibility to protect their interests simply because we can. It is generally agreed upon that technology has improved our lives– whether that be in terms of medicine, entertainment, or even just convenience. Hans Jonas argues in his book The Imperative of Responsibility that technology has also increased both the reach of our actions and our ability to assess their consequences. He argues that this increased ‘reach’ of our actions, paired with our ability to foresee consequences of said actions, creates an obligation to look out for future generations. Let us consider climate change for a moment. The decisions we make in combatting (or not) climate change will have measurably serious consequences for people living one or two hundred years from now, and we know that. Ignoring the negative consequences of said actions seems not only wrong but deeply immoral, for we would be actively choosing to cause harm without any regard for the pain and suffering we would be causing. To be clear, I would not assert that all decisions should be made to best suit the needs of future generations, but rather that their interests ought to be considered when making decisions that could reasonably be seen to affect them. For example, it seems reasonable to say we ought to consider the impacts opening a coal mine might have on future generations in a given region. It does not seem reasonable, however, to base what time you wake up in the morning on the interests of future generations– for they do not have anything truly at stake. This is the framework I find to be the most compelling, what do you think?

Sources: 

Jonas, Hans. The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age. Translated by Jans Jonas and David Herr, University of Chicago Press, 1984.